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The Sword of Damocles
Can the exclusionary rule survive cost-benefit analysis?
by Yale Kamisar
Editor's Note: This article by
Yale Kamisar, Henry King Ransom
Professor of Law, appeared in
slightly abridged form on the Op-Ed
page of the New York Times,
July 11, 1984.
On the last day of the 1983-84
Term, the Supreme Court finally
carved out a so-called "good
faith" exception (actually a "reasonable mistake" exception) to
the 70-year-old exclusionary rule.
That doctrine holds that evidence
obtained by police in violation
of the Fourth Amendment (which
prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures) must be barred
from a criminal trial. Henceforth,
evidence obtained pursuant to a
seareh warrant is admissible if
the police had an "objectively
reasonable belief" in the validity
of the warrant even though, to
put it bluntly, the evidence was
obtained by violating the Fourth
Amendment (but not by too
much).
The Court's long-awaited pronouncement on the oft-proposed
"good faith" modification of the
exclusionary rule came in two
search warrant cases: United States
v. Leon (where the police had
relied on a warrant subsequently
invalidated because unsupported
by "probable cause") and Massachusetts v . Sheppard (where the
police did have ample grounds to
carry out a search but the warrant
at issue failed to satisfy the
Fourth Amendment because it
did not particularly describe the
items to be seized). Although
Sheppard was the much more
publicized case, because it
involved a brutal murder, and the
constitutional violation struck

many as quite "technical," Leon
was the main case-:--and the one
countless lawyers and law students will dissect for years to
come.
Whether the new exception will
be confined to search warrants is
uncertain. I doubt that it will
be. There is considerable language in Leon and Sheppard
dwelling on the search warrant
setting, but running through both
opinions is a strong skepticism
that "the extreme sanction of
exclusion," as the Court twice
called it, can "pay its way" as an
effective deterrent in any situation
unless the underlying Fourth
Amendment violations are deliberate or at least substantial.
Do Leon and Sheppard take the
pressure off the much-criticized
and much-battered exclusibnary
rule or do these cases only render
the rule more vulnerable to efforts
to abolish it entirely? Some
experts believe that the new
exception will "prune" the rule,
dampen widespread criticism of it
and, in the long run, save it (or
what is left of it) from complete
destruction. I disagree. I believe
the new exception makes the rule
· look still less like a constitutional
rule and brings its ultimate
demise one step closer.
Many of the rule's critics will
never rest until they succeed in
stamping it out completely. The
new exception is only likely to
embolden them (although perhaps only after a decent pause) to
launch a final, all-out attack on
the rule itself.
Although one would gain little
inkling of this from recent
Supreme Court opinions, the
famous 1914 Weeks case, which

Yale Kamisar: wondering when the
sword will fall on the exclusionary rule.

first promulgated the exclusionary
rule, rested it not on an empirical
proposition (its supposed deterrent effect on the police), but
on what might be called a "principled basis." The primary goals
of the rule's framers were to avoid
"sanctioning" or "ratifying"
unconstitutional police conduct
that produced the proferred evidence, to preserve the judicial
process from contamination, and
to prevent the government from
profiting from its own Wrongdoing. The framers of the
exclusionary rule may have
expected, or at least hoped, to
affect police behavior, but there is
no suggestion in any of the early
1
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Going my way?
Court, professors split-in
different directions-over
"good faith" exception
In United States v. Leon, handed
down the last day of the 1983-84
Supreme Court Term, a 6-3 majority
adopted the so-called "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule, at
least in search warrant cases, concluding that the "marginal benefits"
produced by suppressing evidence
obtained when police act with objective good faith cannot justify the
"substantial costs" of exclusion. Of
the three U-M law professors who
have addressed this issue, one Gerold
Israel) has supported the good faith
exception, but two (Yale Kamisar and
James Boyd White) have opposed
such an exception and strongly criticized the present Court's "costbenefit" approach to the exclusionary
rule.
Justice Byron White, who wrote the
opinion of the Court in Leon, quoted

cases that the rule's survival was
to depend on proof that it deters
police misconduct.
But ways of thinking about the
exclusionary rule have changed.
Deterrence and cost-benefit analysis have come to center stage.
For example, in the 1974
Calandra case, holding that a
grand jury witness must answer
questions based on the fruits
of an unlawful search, the Court
rejected the view that the rule is a
"personal constitutional right." It
called the rule merely a "judicially
created remedy" designed to
enforce the Fourth Amendment
"through its deterrent effect."
Thus Calandra was said to present
a question "not of rights, but of
remedies" -a question to be
answered by weighing the costs
2
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with approval from Israel, Criminal
Procedure, The Burger Court, and the
Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 Mich.
L.Rev. 1319, 1412-13 (1977): "The key
to the [exclusionary] rule's effectiveness as a deterrent lies [in] the
impetus it has provided to police
training programs that make officers
aware of the limits imposed by the
Fourth Amendment and emphasize
the need to operate within those
limits. [An objective good-faith
exception] is not likely to result in the
elimination of such programs, which
are now viewed as an important
aspect of police professionalism [nor]
encourage officers to pay less attention to what they are taught, as the
requirement that the officer act in
'good faith' is inconsistent with closing one's mind to the possibility of
illegality."
Justice Brennan, who dissented in
Leon, relied, inter alia, on Kamisar,
Does (Did) (Should) The Exclusionary
Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis"
Rather than on "Empirical Proposition"?,
16 Creighton L.Rev. 565 (1983), and
J. B. White, Forgotten Points in the

of the rule against its potential
benefits. The exclusionary rule
lost-as it usually does when the
question is presented this wayand as it did with Leon and

Sheppard.
Ever since the "deterrence"
rationale and its concomitant
"cost-benefit" analysis have come
to the fore, the exclusionary rule
has been sitting under a Sword of
Damocles. There it will remain
until it rests once again on a principled basis.
A cost-benefit approach
strongly favors the exclusionary
rule's critics. The costs of the
rule-for example, the release of a
"plainly guilty" heroin dealerare immediately apparent, but the
rule's benefits are only conjectural. It is never easy to prove a

s

"Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81 Mich.
L.Rev. 1273 (1983), for the view that
the attempt to assess the "benefits"
and "costs" of the exclusionary rule
in various contexts is "a virtually
impossible task for the judiciary to
perform honestly or accurately" and
thus, despite the rhetoric of deterrence, "the reality is that the Court's
opinions represent inherently unstable compounds of intuition, hunches
and occasional pieces of partial and
often inconclusive data." Justice Brennan, also maintained, referring, inter
alia, to Kamisar, Gates, "Probable
Cause," "Good Faith," and Beyond, 69
Iowa L.Rev. 551 (1984), that given
"the relaxed standard" for assessing
probable cause established by the
Court the previous year, "it is virtually inconceivable that a reviewing
Court. ; .could first find that a warrant
was invalid under [the new relaxed
'probable cause'] standard, but then,
at the same time, find that a police
officer's reliance on such an invalid
warrant was nevertheless 'objectively
reasonable' under the test announced
today."~

negative, and police compliance
with the Constitution produces a
non-event not directly
observable-it consists of not
carrying out an illegal search.
Moreover, if one must balance
the competing interests, how
does one do so without measuring imponderables and
comparing incommensurables?
How does one balance the rights
of privacy or liberty against the
interest in suppressing crime?
Since these are different kinds of
interests, how can they be balanced without injecting the policy
values of those doing the
balancing?
The rhetoric of cost-benefit
analysis· is scientific-it is an
inquiry into those facts defining
the costs and benefits that deter-

B

mines the result. But as my
colleague James Boyd White has
recently observed, "the inquiry
can never be performed in an
adequate way, and the reality
thus is that the decision must rest
not upon [scientific] grounds,
but upon prior dispositions or
unarticulated intuitions that are
never justified."
Finally, if not even the direct
victim of a Fourth Amendment
violation has a "constitutional
right" to exclude the evidence-if
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the use of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence presents a
question "not of rights, but of
remedies" -why should the courts
"balance" the costs and the benefits? If, as the Court has told us,
the exclusionary rule's application
turns on a "pragmatic analysis of
its usefulness in a particular context," why not replace judicial
with legislative pragmatism?
In recent years, cost-benefit
analysis has led the Court to
admit unconstitutionally obtained

s
evidence in various peripheral or
collateral settings, such as civil tax
and grand jury proceedings. But
the Court's recent decisions take a
good-sized bite out of the exclusionary rule in its central
application: the prosecutor's casein-chief against the direct victim
of a Fourth Amendment violation.
And they fray the thread that
holds the cost-benefit sword over
the exclusionary rule itself. ~
© 1984 by The New York Times Company.
Reprinted by permission.

Training for traders
l ackson paints the big picture for governmenf officials
In the fast-moving area of
international trade and economic
relations, where casebooks are
outdated almost by the time they
are published, government officials who oversee the day-to-day
implementation of United States
trade policy are often hard.
pressed to keep up with developments in their own fields; a grasp
of the "big picture" becomes a
luxury few have the time for.
Recently, John Walker, assistant
secretary of the United States
Treasury and a Law School alumnus O.D. '66), decided to make
official time for just such an overview. To provide it, he called
upon John Jackson, the Hessel E.
Yntema Professor of Law, an
internationally recognized authority on international trade law
and one of the Law School's most
admired teachers. At the end of
the course, the first such Treasury
Department venture, Jackson
was presented with the Office of
the Secretary Honor Award for
outstanding service to the government" that is expected to enhance
/1

governmental programs related
to trade.
For three Thursdays and Fridays in May, Jackson commuted
to Washington, where an audience of 100 awaited him in the
newly refurbished Cash Room of
the Treasury, once the site of
Grant's inaugural ball. Originally,
Jackson had thought that the 27hour course would simply be a
condensation of his Law School
course in international trade law
and economic relations. But the
overall sophistication of the audience demanded an extensively
revised course. The "students," 80
percent of whom were lawyers,
included personnel from the
Treasury Department, State
Department, Department of Justice, Department of Commerce,
the U.S. Trade Representative's
Office, the International Trade
Commission, and the President's
Commission on Competitiveness.
They ranged in rank from assistant secretaries to the career civil
servants who handle the nittygritty detail of U.S. trade policy.

John Walker presents Jackson with his
award.
"It was an enormous
challenge," says Jackson of his
teaching assignment. "At each
session, there were people who
knew a great deal about the subject and some who knew nothing.
And usually, on any special topic,
there was someone in the room
who knew more than I did. It
really kept me honest."
In a lecture-discussion format,
Jackson covered the "complex and
mystifying" legal structure of
GATT (General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade); the U.S. international trade system-including
the Trade Act of 1974, of which he
was a major draftsman, and the

3

B

Trade Act of 1979, on which he
consulted for the Senate; the
antidumping and countervailing
duties issues; the sticky question
of government subsidies; and
future trade policy issues. He also
discussed the substantial international trade role delegated to U.S.
courts. A product of the legislative branch's distrust of the executive-which colors all aspects of
this country's international trade
policies-the extensive use of
judicial review is a distinctively
American feature.
Jackson is the author of World
Trade and the Law of GATT (1969),
a classic tome that is extensively
relied upon by government officials. His most recent book is
Implementing the Tokyo Round:
National Constitutions and International Economic Rules (University
of Michigan Press, 1984), written
with two other eminent authorities on international trade, JeanVictor Louis (Belgium) and Mitsuo Matsushita (Japan). This work
is unusual in its emphasis on
the interplay between international economic agreements and
domestic law. The book treats the
implementation of the GATTTokyo Round in the United
States, the European Economic
Community, and Japan as a case
study of the legal processes and
constraints that influence international economic negotiations.
Jackson and his colleagues found
substantial differences not only in
negotiation systems but in the
degree to which international
rules were-or could be-incorporated in domestic law.
Spurred by preparations for his
Treasury Department course, Jackson has already begun work on
his next book, on international
trade law and policy. Michigan
law students will also reap the
benefits of Jackson's Washington
service, in the form of a substantially revamped Law School
course in international trade. 131
4
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Beloved Law School professor dies
University community mourns Marcus Plant
Marcus L. Plant, distinguished
University of Michigan law professor and representative to the
nation's top governing bodies in
amateur sports, died suddenly
at his Ann Arbor home Sunday,
July 15, 1984. He was 72 years
old.
Plant was a Law School faculty
member for 36 years, during
which time he worked and wrote
in several fields, including
workers' compensation and
employment rights, torts, the law
of medical practice, and medicallegal problems. He was the author
of Cases on the Law of Torts (1953)
and co-author of several editions
(1962, 1974, 1980) of Cases and
Materials on Workers' Compensation
and Employment Rights. H is exploration of the relationships
between law and medicine
resulted in The Law of Medical
Practice (1959), which he coauthored with Burke Shartel.
Plant continued to teach following
his formal retirement in 1982 and
was visiting professor at other
law schools.
"Marc Plant was a 'Yarm personal colleague, but he was also
the epitome of the scholar-teacher
. who makes our University a great
one," said Law Professor Allan
Smith, a long-time colleague and
former Law School dean and U-M
interim president. "He was
thorough in his research, often
anticipating developments in his
field of expertise, and was
devoted to his teaching career. He
will be greatly missed."
Former students, Law School
colleagues, and m embers of the
U-M Athletics Department joined
Plant's family and his many other
friends at a memorial service at
St. Francis of Assisi Catholic

Church. Among the speakers to
eulogize him was Law Professor
John Reed, whose remarks appear
on the following page.
As Reed noted, Plant's busy
"other life" in athletics had no
effect on his extraordinary commitment to the Law School. In
1978, Plant completed a 24-year
tenure as the University's faculty
representative to the National
Colleg!ate Athletic Association
(NCAA), the Big Ten athletic conference, and to related groups.
During eight consecutive threeyear terms, he also represented
the U-M in the Western Collegiate
Hockey Association and was a
member of the U-M Board in
Control of Intercollegiate Athletics. In addition to becoming the
dean of Big Ten faculty representatives, he was president of the
NCAA in 1967-68, served many
years on NCAA policy-making
committees, and from 1968 to
1972 represented the association
on the board of directors and

Marcus L. Plant
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executive committee of the U.S.
Olympic Committee. Plant was
the NCAA's president when it
established its first committee
concerned with increasing
women's participation in intercollegiate sports.
Plant was born November 10,
1911, in New London, Wisconsin.
He received a B.A. degree and a
master's degree in economics
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from Lawrence College in Appleton, Wisconsin. After teaching
high school for three years, he
entered the U-M Law School,
earning his degree in 1938. His
legal career included private practice in Milwaukee and New York
and service with the Office of
Price Administration.
Plant is survived by his wife,
Geraldine; three daughters, Mrs .

s
Margaret Calestro of Columbus,
Ohio, Mrs. Elizabeth Moore of
Owen Sound, Ontario, and
Nancy K. Plant of Ann Arbor;
one son, Mark W. Plant of Los
Angeles; a sister, Esther Shibley;
and two grandchildren. Memorial
contributions may be sent to the
Law School Scholarship Fund
or to the U-M Athletic Department Scholarship Fund. ~

Memorial for Marcus L. Plant
by John W. Reed
Marc Plant came to the University of Michigan law faculty 38
years ago as one of the group of
able young lawyers recruited
to teach the flood of war veterans
resuming their educations after
World War II . That young midcentury faculty was the foundation on which the School's
present excellence was built, and
Marc was a central figure in it.
He brought to the faculty a pragmatic perspective drawn from
some eight years of practice in
Milwaukee and New York and a
brief turn in the Washington
bureaucracy, but he also brought
a deep concern that the law be
fair and the legal profession
humane.
Marc was a good colleague.
Differences of opinion never
became points of estrangement,
and his gentlemanly response
to disagreement encouraged free
and creative discussions. Not
all our conversations were professional, I hasten to add. He was
a collector of jokes, some of
which were truly atrocious . He
and Hart Wright and I-and
in an earlier day, Alan Polaskywould exchange the latest groaners almost every day. But there
was among us the tacit under-

standing that the story would be
immediately passed along the
corridor to the rest of our colleagues. To have the fun of telling
my own new story several times,
I knew that I had to avoid telling
it early to Marc, or Hart or Alan;
and, of course, Marc lost exclusive rights to his stories once he
had told them to one of us. I
wish I had a file of them,
although I admit that it might
appeal only to a few of us with
warped senses of humor.
No one, I think, took more
seriously than he his role as
a teacher. Prepared, thorough,
sound-these elementary obligations of a teacher he discharged
as a matter of course, as generations of students will attest. He
was also clear and understandable-qualities that made him
especially appreciated by students in the difficult, allimportant first year.
But beyond these qualities
were others less common, or, at
least, ones not taken for granted.
He cared about his students as
individuals, and they knew this.
All of us are asked by our students for letters of recommendation,
but Marc much more than most,
and he responded with unfailing

generosity. Because of the large
size of law school classes, the
letters most of us write on behalf
of our students are often rather
impersonal. His letters about his
students, in contrast, reveal personal knowledge of each student
as an individual. The University
and the Law School are the beneficiaries of the affection and good
will Marc generated among more
than 35 classes of our graduates.
This keen interest in individuals
continued to the very end, in
his generous but unsung role as
an adviser to the School's minority students. He cared about all
his students, one by one, and
they responded warmly to him.
In the Law School he taught
a course in law and medicine,
always oversubscribed. But he
also taught such a course from
time to time in the medical
school, and in that role became
one of those exceedingly rare
lawyers held in esteem by
doctors.
Marc understood that an educational enterprise is corporate as
well as individual, and that the
teacher must shoulder part of the
administrative burdens. He carried at least his share of these.
There is not much unusual in
(continued)
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that. But what is unusual is the
degree to which he discharged
Law School and University
assignments without complaint
and without asking for reduced
teaching loads or preferential
class scheduling. Not even his
"other life" in athletics led to any
abatement of his commitment to
the Law School. Much like the
Alec Guinness character in
" Captain's Paradise," he was able
to keep it all going at once, modestly, unassumingly.
Finally, he did not neglect
scholarship. He produced widely
used texts in his fields of interest, all the while he was fulfilling
his other responsibilities in and
out of the Law School. And he
continued his scholarly work in
retirement; indeed, at his death
he ~as preparing a revised edition of one of his books. That
scholarship and intellectual
curiosity made his teaching
imaginative and forward-looking.
He accurately prophesied many
of the developments in the law of
medical practice, in employment
rights, and in his basic field of
torts; and as a consequence his
students became forward-looking
lawyers who, unsurprised by
change, are competent to practice
in a constantly changing society.
In short, Marc Plant was the
"compleat teacher." Thorough
scholar, careful expositor, caring
counselor, congenial colleagueall of these he was. For his having been among us, we are the
richer-his school, his students,
his colleagues, his friends, you
and I. We shall miss him. But
today we rejoice-rejoice in a life
well and usefully lived-rejoice
in a life that gave much to others.
And, rejoicing, we thank God
for him who was among us. ~

Law Professor John Reed, a longtime colleague and friend of Marcus
Plant's, delivered these affecting
reminiscences at a memorial service
held Wednesday, July 18, 1984, at
St. Francis of Assisi Catholic
Church in Ann Arbor.
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Watching your language
Leading free speech scholar joins facuity
He came, he saw, he stayed. In
July, Frederick Schauer, a visiting
professor at the Law School during
the 1983-84 academic year, joined
the permanent faculty.
A prolific scholar who has
established a reputation as one of
the nation's leading students of constitutional law, Schauer came to
Michigan from the College of
William and Mary, where he was
the Cutler Professor of Law. He
holds A.B. and M.B.A. degrees from
Dartmouth College and a J.D. from
Harvard University. Before beginning his academic career at West
Virginia University in 1974, he
spent several years in private
practice.
In an interview last summer,
Professor Schauer discussed his
research interests and the path that
led him to academia. New faculty
members Rebecca S. Eisenberg and
Jessica D. Litman will be profiled in
the next issue of the magazine.

Free speech expert Frederick
Schauer is as easy with words as
he is with the animated gestures
that punctuate his conversation.
Asked what motivated his move
to Michigan, Schauer hesitates
only a millisecond. "More than
any place I've ever seen," he says,
"the Law School is a community
in which serious, committed
scholarship is a respected
activity."
But had anyone suggested to
him, upon his graduation from
Harvard Law School in 1972, that
he was destined for the faculty
of one of the nation's preeminent
law schools, words just might
have failed him. Uninterested in
an academic career, he also lacked

the law school credits that,
crowned with a clerkship, open
ivy-covered doors.
He had not made law review;
he wasn't number one in his
class. In fact, during his first year
at Harvard, he had hardly gone
to class, expecting daily that
Uncle Sam would make good on a
September promise to draft him,
thus saving him from final examinations. The army finally caught
up with Schauer at the end of his
second year, "rescuing" him not
from first-year examinations but
from the finals of Harvard's moot
court competition.
After graduating from Harvard,
Schauer practiced for two years
with the Boston, Massachusetts,
firm of Fine & Ambrogne. Within
the relatively small firm, which
at the time represented the Boston Celtics and a number of other
clients in professional sports, he
enjoyed "the type of practice my
classmates would have killed for."
His docket burgeoned with interesting, sophisticated cases for
which he had significant responsibility: sports law cases, antitrust
and securities law cases, and a
fair amount of what he first
euphemistically called "constitutional" litigation.
"I defended dirty movies,"
Schauer translates. "One of the
firm's clients was in the movie
business, and he discovered there
was more money in dirty movies
than in clean ones. So I became
a constitutional lawyer."
Paradoxically, it was Schauer's
intense interest in his constitutional law practice that caused his
departure for academe. "There was
never enough of my time or the
client's money to pursue the issues
in depth," he says. "The scholar
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Frederick Schauer

in me began to come out."
Schauer joined the West
Yirginia University law faculty,
bringing both the practitioner's
experience and the scholar's curiosity to bear on the first subject
he probed: obscenity law. The
result was his highly regarded
1976 book, The Law of Obscenity.
Indeed, most of Schauer's scholarship-distinguished, says Dean
Terrance Sandalow, "by penetrating analysis and a willingness
to question conventional
wisdom" -has been concerned
with problems of freedom of
speech. His most recent book,

Free Speech: A Philosophical
Enquiry, emerged from his year as
a senior scholar at Cambridge
University and has been widely
praised by both legal scholars and
philosophers.

If the impetus for Schauer's
interest in free speech came from
his practice, his year at Cambridge joined to it a strong
interest in philosophy of language
and a belief that most traditional
free speech thinkers underestimate the power of language.
"Many of my views about free
speech-which are skeptical and
far from universally accepted," he
allows-"are premised on an
understanding of what language
can do. To me, it seems odd to
consider speech 'harmless,' for
speech can and does cause the
kinds of consequences normally
considered appropriate for governmental response. Speech can
hurt people, and preventing hurts
is the type of thing we expect
the state to do.
"So, one of the questions I find

myself asking is, 'Is there any
reason for a distinct principle that
relates to free speech?' In looking
at that question, I'm skeptical. I
find most of the arguments for
free-speech-as-a-good-thing troubling or nonpersuasive. Speech
is good, and important, but so
are lots of other values, including
many of the values, such as privacy, reputation, and security,
often invoked as justifications for
restricting speech. The question
to be asked is why we should
carve out a special principle for
speech, and it is that question to
which I have yet to discover a
satisfactory answer."
Schauer's skepticism does not
overflow its philosophical boundaries to dampen his enthusiasm
for, and commitment to, constitutional text. A second facet of
7
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Schauer's free speech explorations
deals with the First Amendment:
How can it best protect free
speech at the core-governmental
regulation of its critics? Here
again, Schauer's views diverge
from canon.
"The standard view," he
explains, "is that more protection
is better. I take a 'narrow but
strong' view of the First Amendment, one that says we shouldn't
protect tangential First Amendment concerns. When we allow
First Amendment principles to
protect advertising and unabashed hardcore pornography
and that sort of thing, we run a
serious risk of diluting the
amendment's protection. First
Amendment doctrine is like an oil
spill: Its protection is likely to
thin as it expands."
The counterintuitive nature of
free speech principles makes it
particularly easy to spread First
Amendment protection too thin,
Schauer contends. "If there were
no U.S. Constitution," he theorizes, "we might say that if
speech has harmful consequences,
we should do something about
the speech. One of the more
interesting things about free
speech is that despite 200 years of
Fourth of July speeches praising
it and 65 years of litigation
defending it, there is little public
support for the value. Most people think it's okay only if it takes
place Somewhere Else. As soon as
it comes near them, they want to
suppress it."
A look at those 65 years of litigation makes clear why this
should be so. "One of the significant things about free speech
adjudication," notes Schauer, "is
that the litigants are frequently
despicable individuals with ridiculous or offensive things to say.
It would do wonders for popular
acceptance of free speech principles if the government were to
prosecute the works of Lawrence
8
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Welk, Norman Rockwell, or some
other publicly popular communicator." Until then, he points out,
long-term protection of free
speech will continue to hinge on
the willingness of judges, juries,
and the general public to recognize less savory litigants' claimsand on their ability to see that
their own long-term rights are at
stake. This, says Schauer,
becomes more and more difficult
when free speech principles are
trivialized by the inclusion of
tangential concerns.
Schauer also sees problems in
the current trend, within First
Amendment doctrine, toward the
use of finer instruments calibrated
to distinct categories of speech.
"Implicit in the First Amendment," he says, "is the idea that
we will protect short-term evil
to ensure the long-term value. To
do so, we must look at large values or categories rather than
particular cases. Since many First
Amendment claims are made on
behalf of unattractive people
espousing loathsome attitudes,
looking at the value of the particular speech at issue in a particular
case is likely to undervalue the
long-term First Amendment
concerns."
The idea of more finely calibrated instruments is not totally
without merit, Schauer acknowledges, and he does not object
. to some line drawing within the
First Amendment. "There are
intuitively correct differences," he
notes, "between the principles
we should apply to political argument and pure commercial
advertising, for example. But it's
too easy for lawyers to ignore
fundamental differences in favor
of worrying excessively about
how to draw lines at the edges.
Ask a lawyer about the difference
between day and night and you'll
get a discourse on dusk. It's the
lawyer's disease."
Limiting the disease's incur-

s
sions- or at least describing its
manifestations-also ranks high
on Schauer's research agenda.
"Both in the areas of constitutional adjudication and legal
theory," he says, 'Tm concerned
about legal categories and line
drawing, and how these relate to
the conceptual categories we use.
Too many people take the inability to draw a precise line as
conclusive evidence that you can't
make a distinction. That's just
invalid. We can't spend all our
time nibbling around the edges.
We must deal with fundamental
differences.
"I'm concerned with the way
law operates outside the narrow
range of legal life that is of concern to lawyers. It is too easy for
lawyers to generalize from the
part of the law that they see to
the nature of law itself."
Lawyers,· Schauer notes, deal
in close cases-the ones that
are worthy of litigating. As a
scholar, he finds himself equally,
if not more, interested in easy
cases, and in how the Constitution operates, beyond close
cases, to constitute American
society.
As a constitutional theorist,
what distinguishes Schauer from
his colleagues is his close attention to text and his view that
constitutional rhetoric rules out
wrong answers rather than pointing out right ones. Hand in hand
with his belief in the power of
language goes pragmatic recognition of its limits.
"If we expect too much from
language then we will give up on
it too easily," he insists. "If we
have a more modest, realistic
expectation of how language
operates, including an understanding of the uncertainty and
imprecision inherent in both language and life, then we will not
be attracted to the nihilism that
afflicts the disappointed seeker of
absolute precision." 181
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A dean called Sue
Students love her, administrators promote her
Susan M. Eklund, a Law
School assistant dean since 1976,
has been promoted to associate
dean for student affairs and
operations.
Announcing the appointment
last spring, Dean Terrance
Sandalow cited both the broad
range of Dean Eklund's responsibilities and her exceptional skill
in discharging them. "It would
be an understatement to say
merely that Dean Eklund has
performed superbly in her years
at the Law School," he said. "Her
performance has been notable
for unusual initiative, imagination, and sound judgment.
"Dean Eklund's current responsibilities are very broad," he
added, "extending to all areas of
student life except admissions
and curriculum. In addition, she
serves as secretary of the faculty
and has begun taking on special
projects. As associate dean,
she will undoubtedly take on
additional special projects as the
need arises."
Eklund received her B.A.
degree in 1970 and her J.D.
degree in 1973 from the U-M.
Upon graduation, she spent two
years as a legal services staff
attorney on a Navajo Indian reservation in Arizona. Before
assuming her Law School position in 1976, she was associated
with the Research Group, Inc.,
an Ann Arbor firm that provided
research services to the legal
profession. all

As the faculty began its recessional at Senior Day ceremonies
this spring, law students-now
officially former law studentsthrew their caps in the air and
gave their mentors a round of
applause. They reserved a special
last hurrah for Law School Associate Dean Susan Eklund, who
exited to heartfelt cries of "Yeah,
Dean Sue!" impromptu thank
you's for aiding and abetting
their law school careers.
"Dean Sue" earns bouquets
from students and colleagues
alike. Described in one prelaw
handbook as " th·~ nicest law
school dean in the country,"
Eklund occupies a position that
receives serious attention at very
few law schools. As dean for student services, her most important
. product is a student's successful
progress through law school; to
that end, she is counselor and
mother confessor as much as
administrator.
Eklund's reputation for accessibility (and for bending the rules
when the case merits and setting
limits with warmth when it does
not) is one she tends carefully.
"We do a lot of advertising," the
36-year-old dean says quite
simply.
Example: Although Eklund
greets all new students during
orientation, she makes a point of
renewing the acquaintance by
meeting with every first-year case
club later in the academic year.
The setting-Dominick's-is as
informal as the business
conducted.
"We discuss mundane sorts of
things," she says. "How the
water is warm in the drinking
fountains; how professor so-andso is only one-quarter of the way

Susan M. Eklund

through the syllabus-I assure
them he'll get through and that
they'd better, too-and then I
approach more difficult topicshow law school is competitive
and what the job alternatives are.
Always, after one of those meetings, I increase business.
"I think the contact with the
students tends to give the job its
purpose," she reflects. "Discussing drop-add deadlines is not
particularly sustaining in the long
term, but it gives you a chance
to get to know the students-and
to see them grow. There's a lot
of satisfaction in helping people
discover how to be a student and
a lawyer.
"Our students are quite
mature, but many times they
have real-life problems that
encroach on their studies-parttime jobs or family difficulties.
People say it's a lot easier to be a
student than to be in practice, but
in practice, you set your own
timetable to a greater extent than
we sometimes assert. Students
can't do that."
9
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For Eklund, smoothing students' paths through law school
may mean agreeing to reschedule
an exam (students often want
the date pushed forward rather
than back) or making financial
aid arrangements for a student
who temporarily is not enrolled
but is working on an incomplete.
It also involves taking what
Eklund terms a "systems approach"
to the student services enterprise,
an approach that, she says, lends
a measure of excitement to routine administrative duties.
When Eklund first assumed
her deanship, many of the Law
School offices that work with
students-offices like Financial
Aid, Placement, and Records, all
of which now report to herreported to other people. The
result was that when students
made inquiries or suggestions,
she had no clear authority to take
action. "At the same time,"
she says, "no one else was
responsible for evaluating the
way in which the many pieces of
a law student's life-classes,
extracurricular interests, career
planning, finances, personal circumstances-fit together, or
worse yet, didn't fit together.
"The operations of the Law
School offices that serve students
are all interrelated," she continues. "If a student is scared about
finding a summer job, in part
because of concern about financial aid, that student can't go
to the Records Office in the
middle of the placement season
to be told, in an unfriendly
tone, that a transcript won't be
ready for two weeks. It's making
this type of connection that
interests me."
In her student days, Eklund
had quite different interests. A
political science major and Spanish minor as a U-M undergraduate, Eklund had as her life
goal the transformation of Latin
American dictatorships into great
10
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Counseling students is a vital part of Associate Dean Susan M. Eklund's job.

democracies. The radical 60s,
she says, modifietl. her ambitions:
"I decided that the best thing we
could do for South America was
to leave it alone. I changed my
goal to merely saving the United
States. I went to law school with
that in mind."
After completing law school at
the U-M, Eklund spent two years
as a legal services attorney on a
Navajo Indian reservation in Arizona, working primarily in the
areas of consumer protection,
students' rights, and welfare. The
people for whom she worked
were poor, and few spoke English; her home was a tiny town
"100 miles from the nearest stoplight in all directions." Says
Eklund: "It was as much like the
Peace Corps as it could be and
still be in this country."
Eklund enjoyed legal services
work, but not the aggressiveness
that litigating demanded. When
she returned to Ann Arbor with
her husband, Stephen, a dentist
who worked for the Indian Health
Service, it was with an eye
toward university administration
and to a one-year job with the
Research Group, Inc.
Shortly after her return, Eklund

participated in the Law School's
first alumnae conference, never
thinking the appearance would
land her a job. But when the
assistant deanship, then held by
Rhonda Rivera, came open a few
months later, Eklund received a
call from Dean Theodore
St. Antoine.
"I was startled when Ted
called," Eklund remembers. "I
was sure he had discovered some
unpaid tuition or that my degree
was being rescinded." But no, the
dean wanted to know if she was
interested in Rivera's job. She
was indeed. Just a few days
earlier she had read about the
opening, lamenting to her spouse
that she was too young for the
job and that she wished the Law
School knew how good she'd
be for the position.
That Eklund had only one skill
she considered relevant to the job
at the time-her years as an orientation leader-proved an
advantage, she feels: "I was a
blank slate. I was not astute about
the power structure, and I had
no preconceptions about the job.
I had no other approach than
what would be logical. And
maybe, being a woman, I wasn't

B

fearful of asking questions. A
lot of men would not have gone
to the faculty and said: 'Tell me
what you'd like to teach.' But
I did, and the result was that
some of our very best teachers
revealed a desire to teach firstyear courses."
Asked if being a woman is an
advantage in her position, Eklund
responds that it may be. "I think
I'm more willing to express sympathy," she allows. "When a
student makes a request to which
many males' first reaction would
be, 'That's outrageous!' my first
inclination is to say, 'That's a
terrible situation. Let's discuss all
the options and their consequences.' In the end, though, I
may handle the request in the
same way my colleagues would."
Since she assumed the deanship, Eklund has had two
children, and portraits of the Law
School staff, sketched by her
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6-year-old son, David, give her
Law School quarters the comfortable ambience of a pediatrician's
office. "I don't think it hurts to
have had a couple of kids since I
came," she offers. "It makes it
visible that I do some nurturing
elsewhere-so maybe I could
do some here, too. Nobody
knows what men do at home."
There may be a certain constancy to the questions students
bring to Eklund as they peruse
David's newest artistic creations.
The dean, however, finds herself
seeking new, improved answers
to their questions as she grapples
with the issue of financial indebtedness-as elsewhere, the
average student loan debt upon
graduation exceeds $20 ,000-and
ponders low-cost solutions to
integrating skillS' training into the
curriculum without sacrificing
its intellectual core. "There's also
more we need to do to help stu-

s
dents make sensible placement
choices," Eklund says.
Eleven years after completing
law school, Eklund is content
to leave the saving of these
United States to someone else. "If
one person can help make life a
bit better for a fair number of
people, that's worth a lot," she
philosophizes.
"Our grads assume powerful
positions, and I like to think that
I've helped to teach them that
there can be a humanity without
sacrificing standards and quality.
The students who come to me
with budgets for student activities
invariably overstate their needs. I
say, 'Now tell me what you really
need.' It's a revelation to them
that they could make an honest
request and have it dealt with
honestly. I'd like to think they'll
remember that during negotiations for a merger or a divorce
settlement." isl

Deans and directors
Old friends assume new positions
Last July, Dean Terrance Sandalow announced three new
administrative appointments in
the Law School. Beginning September 1, Professor Beverley J.
Pooley became associate dean for
the Law Library for a five-year
term. Margaret Leary succeeded
him as Law Library director. Also
effective September 1, Virginia B.
Gordan became assistant dean
for a three-year term.
Pooley joined the law faculty in
1962 and has been director of
the Law Library since 1965. His
new administrative appointment
"recognizes a realignment of
responsibilities between him and

Margaret Leary, who will become
director of the Law Library,"
Dean Sandalow said. "Professor
Pooley will be concerned mainly
with major budgetary and policy
issues confronting the Library
and with assuring its continuing
responsiveness to educational and
research objectives determined
by the faculty."
Pooley holds an LLB. degree
from the University of Cambridge
in England and earned LL.M.
and S.J.D. degrees from the U-M.
One of the Law School's most
spirited and popular teachers, he
has written on the subject of land
use controls in the United States

Beverley J. Pooley
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Margaret A. Leary

Virginia B. Gordan

and is presently interested in
contracts and in African law.
Before coming to the Law School,
he taught at the University of
Ghana.
Leary, who was previously the
Law Library's associate director,
joined the Law School staff as

assistant director of the Law
Library in 1973. From 1968 to
1970, when she began law school,
Leary was chief cataloger at the
University of Minnesota Law
Library. She holds a B.A. from
Cornell University, an M.A.
degree in library science from

the University of Minnesota, and
a J.D. from William Mitchell
College of Law in St. Paul. In
addition to her duties at the Law
Library, she also serves as a
lecturer in the U-M School of
Library Science.
Gordan joined the Law School
staff in 1981 as coordinator of
academic programs. "Ms. Gordan's duties at the School have
grown to include a broad range of
activities," Dean Sandalow said.
"She is immediately responsible
for administration of the School's
graduate program and of its
Minority Academic Advancement
Program. In addition, she shares
responsibility for academic and
personal counseling of all J.D.
candidates."
Gordan holds an A. B. degree
from Brown University and a J.D.
degree from the University of
Pennsylvania. Before coming
to Michigan, she was associate
director of the Legal Research and
Writing Program at the University
of Virginia Law School and practiced law in Washington, D.C.
and Philadelphia. S

Ross accepts
government tax post

with the Congress. Its responsibilities include formulating the
administration's tax proposals and
shepherding such proposals
through the Congress. It also has
oversight responsibilities for tax
rulings and regulations originating with the Internal Revenue
Service. One of Ross's first tasks
will be the development of
interpretive regulations for the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.
Ross, who is a Law School
alumnus G.D. '78), joined the
Law School faculty in 1982 after
clerking for the Honorable
J. Edward Lumbard of the Federal

Court of Appeals in New York
City and practicing with the firm
of Davis Polk & Wardell, where
he specialized in tax law. Tax law
has continued to be the major
focus of his scholarly work, and
his new government job places
him in a key tax policy position
at a time when major tax reform
is likely. "Whoever is elected as
president in November," he predicted, "is almost certain to
rethink tax policy in a rather
wholesale fashion. The major
decisions will be made at various
levels, but I hope to have some
influence on the form they take." S

In July, Professor Dennis Ross
began a two-year leave of absence
from the Law School during
which he will serve the federal
government as deputy tax legislative counsel in the United States
Treasury Department.
The Office of the Tax Legislative
Counsel, which reports to the
Treasury Department's assistant
secretary for tax policy, is the
executive branch's tax advocate
12

